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ARTICLE
ORNAMENTAL REPUGNANCY: IDENTITARIAN
ISLAM AND THE IRAQI CONSTITUTION
HAIDER ALA HAMOUDI*
I. INTRODUCTION—SEMANTIC OBSESSIONS
Let me begin by positing a fact that as of the time of publication re-
mains true, the explanation for which will be the subject of this essay.
Nearly six years after the enactment of Iraq’s final constitution, the Federal
Supreme Court of Iraq has rendered only a single ruling1 respecting the
conformity of any law to the “settled rulings of Islam” despite the Court
being empowered to engage in precisely this type of review under Article 2
of the Iraqi Constitution.2
I shall turn to the single example of Article 2 review in a moment, for
it is quite interesting and worthy of some consideration. For now, however,
it suffices to say that if one’s sole exposure to Iraq’s constitution was
through the literature produced by our legal scholars, the broad lack of con-
cern with Article 2 would be not only startling, but, in fact, rather shocking.
Article 2’s so-called “repugnancy” provision has garnered a great deal of
attention over the past several years. Ran Hirschl, for example, describes
Iraq as part of a global phenomenon he calls “constitutional theocracy.”3 In
an interesting article concerning the legitimacy of the invocation of a higher
set of religious principles within a national constitutional framework, Larry
* Haider Ala Hamoudi is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh
School of Law. He has recently returned from a year-long contract in Baghdad advising Iraq’s
legislature on, among other things, constitutional amendments and commercial and financial legis-
lation. He is currently writing a book on the drafting and subsequent evolution of the Iraq
Constitution.
1. Federal Supreme Court, Decision No. 60 of 2010, available at http://www.iraqja.iq/view.
738/.
2. Article 2, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of
2005.
3. Ran Hirschl, The Rise of Constitutional Theocracy, 49 HARV. INT’L. L.J. ONLINE 72, 79
n.13, 82 (2008), www.harvardilj.org/attach.php?id=157. In fact, Hirschl’s position is not far from
my own, viewing as he does the constitutional system as a means to constrain more radical theo-
cratic impulses. My own view is that inasmuch as Iraq is concerned, the supposedly radical the-
ocrats themselves are not appreciably more interested in a truly robust role for shari’a than
secularists.
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Cata´ Backer likewise categorizes Iraq as part of the rising trend of (to use
his term) “theocratic constitutionalism.”4 Noah Feldman goes further, find-
ing in repugnancy, in Iraq as elsewhere, evidence of the “Rise of the Islamic
State” after its dramatic collapse over a century ago.5 Yet one would expect
that if Article 2 were so fundamental to the Iraqi legal framework as to
constitute the “Rise of the Islamic State” or the advent of “theocratic consti-
tutionalism,” then surely the Iraqis themselves would have paid more than
passing attention to it by now.
What might account for the near total indifference to Article 2? We
may begin by leaving aside the more common and casual explanations that
might be offered. The startling lack of attention does not lie in any general
lack of activity on the part of the Federal Supreme Court, which has issued
dozens of opinions each year on various constitutional provisions.6 Nor
could it be related to the possible unwillingness of a supposedly weak judi-
ciary to address sensitive matters, as the Federal Supreme Court has not
hesitated to issue opinions on quite controversial (and constitutional) mat-
ters of considerable political import, including those pertaining to, for ex-
ample, which political faction may have the first opportunity to form the
new government after an election.7 Surely by now somebody should have
invoked Article 2 to confront cornerstone provisions of existing Iraqi law;
for example, the permissibility of money interest on a loan as set forth in
the Iraqi Civil Code,8 or the sections of the Personal Status Law that re-
strict, but do not prohibit, polygamy.9
The wide discrepancy between Western expectations and Iraqi reality
is rooted in the manner in which commentators tend to study constitutions
drafted under conditions similar to those of Iraq (or, put more precisely,
after a dramatic political realignment). There is a depressing pattern in the
publication of most work of this sort that seems rather difficult to dislodge.
A constitution is enacted and there is a flurry of attention given to it imme-
diately following its enactment, often by scholars whose knowledge of the
domestic legal context in which the constitution is being enacted is limited,
to say the least. Given this, the only truly reliable reference point for such
scholars is the text of the constitution itself, often in translation, and
whatever regional or global analogies the scholar may choose to draw. At
some point not long after enactment, nearly all attention to the subject rap-
idly subsides as the new constitution no longer appears as new and there-
4. Larry Cata´ Backer, Theocratic Constitutionalism: An Introduction to a New Global Legal
Ordering, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 85, 150, 168 (2009).
5. NOAH FELDMAN, THE FALL AND RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 11–14 (2008).
6. See THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY, available at http://www.iraqja.iq/decision/ (last visited
Jan. 29, 2011).
7. Federal Supreme Court, Decision No. 25 of 2010, available at http://www.iraqja.org/opn/
25fed2010.htm.
8. Civil Code No. 40 of 1951, Article 692.
9. Personal Status Law No. 188 of 1959, Article 3(4).
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fore worthy of consideration. As a result, even years later, the only
available scholarship focuses on the document at the moment of enactment.
Such scholarship is, for the reasons set forth above, exceedingly textual,
devoid of any mention of actual court practice in the state in which the
constitution is being actively applied by the local judiciary, and therefore
hardly an accurate barometer of relevant constitutional practice in the
emerging constitutional state.10 Nowhere is this truer than in analyses of the
Iraqi Constitution in general and of its articles respecting the role of Islam
in the state in particular, where Iraqi praxis has been entirely disregarded in
favor of linguistic rumination.
To be clear, there is nothing inherently wrong in the abstract with the
scholarly approach I have outlined above, in the Iraqi context or outside it.
For commentators such as Hirschl and Backer, for example, Iraq is only a
passing and rather marginal example of what they view as a much broader
phenomenon, and in that sense, their lack of attention to Iraqi praxis is
understandable even if it does create a misimpression respecting the legal
importance that may be attributed to Article 2. Even work that focuses more
centrally on the constitutional phrasing in Iraq has its place. Thus, Professor
Stilt’s development of a range of possibilities concerning what the precur-
sor to Article 2 of the Iraqi Constitution might mean, drawing upon other
regional examples with which she is familiar to guide her, is insightful.11
The same might be said of comparable work from Intisar Rabb whose ap-
proach to Article 2, and in particular her rather fascinating comparison to
Morocco, is noteworthy.12
10. Naturally, there are exceptions to such patterns. South Africa, for example, has continued
to receive ample attention in United States legal scholarship long after the enactment of its consti-
tution, thereby enabling access to the fascinating process of constitutional practice in that emerg-
ing democratic state. Perhaps this is because of its common law tradition, its use of English in
matters of law, and the outstanding caliber of its own professoriate. For an excellent and brief
example of such work in the context of the practical implementation of provisions concerning
women’s rights by the South African Constitutional Court, see Penelope Andrews, Evaluating the
Progress of Women’s Rights on the Fifth Anniversary of the South African Constitution, 26 VT. L.
REV. 829 (2002). See also Penelope Andrews, Perspectives on Brown: The South African Experi-
ence, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1155 (2005) (discussing the equality provisions of the South Afri-
can constitution both as written and as developed by the Constitutional Court). South Africa is not
the only example.  In the matter of Islam and the state, there is also the substantial and laudable
work of Clark Lombardi on the implementation of Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution by the
Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt. See CLARK B. LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW IN
MODERN EGYPT: THE INCORPORATION OF THE SHARI’A INTO EGYPTIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(2006). Nevertheless, these are exceptions that prove the rule. Even the most cursory Westlaw
search will reveal that for the bulk of states with new constitutions following drastic regime
changes, from Kosovo to Nepal, the scholarly attention for the most part is brief, focused on the
period immediately following enactment, and written by authors whose knowledge of the state in
question is, often by their own admission, limited.
11. See Kristen A. Stilt, Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of the Iraqi Legal Sys-
tem, 36 GEO.WASH. INT’L L. REV. 695 (2004).
12. Intisar A. Rabb, “We the Jurists”: Islamic Constitutionalism in Iraq, 10 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 527, 572–79 (2008). I say this with somewhat more misgiving given Rabb’s rather perplexing
insistence, on the basis of her own bare textual analysis, to declare particular readings of the text
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The point, therefore, is not so much to criticize such work as to qualify
its importance. Specifically, while linguistic considerations and analyses
based exclusively on text have their purposes, their value is largely limited
to the period immediately following enactment. If I might draw upon an
American analogy by way of illustration, hypothetically and anachronisti-
cally conceived, an informed, insightful, and scintillating law review article
written upon the enactment of the U.S. Constitution might well discuss
whether the Constitution would permit Congress to create a National Bank.
Such an analysis might draw upon regional and global examples of rele-
vance, point to broader global phenomena taking place at the time, and be
worthy of consideration from academics and policy makers alike. It would
be a rather depressing set of affairs, however, if scholarship like this were
all that was said about the matter decades later, long after McCulloch v.
Maryland,13 let alone the massive realignment of power following both the
Civil War and the New Deal. A near-exclusive focus on text after much
constitutional praxis is likely to lead to distorting results.
While clearly much less time has elapsed since the creation of the Iraqi
Constitution as compared to the American, I fear that the near-exclusive
linguistic focus has caused the broader legal community to miss an impor-
tant post-ratification trend that has developed concerning Article 2. Specifi-
cally, the clause is swiftly devolving from a matter that was of some
importance during constitutional negotiations into one that is more sym-
bolic than real—an assertion of identity, primarily of the Islamic variety
(though when combined with Article 92, to some extent of the Shi’i Islamic
variety)—rather than a phrase of legal substance. Iraqis appear to have
reached a careful, unspoken consensus that, irrespective of the extent to
which Islam or Islamic law is to be relevant in Iraq, the judiciary is not the
institution best equipped to address questions of Islamicity of law, and thus
Article 2, and indeed the very notion of repugnancy, is best rendered margi-
nal in terms of its legal effect.
This is not to say, however, that the judiciary is entirely irrelevant as
concerns Article 2, as the single example in which the Court agreed to ad-
dress the question of repugnancy demonstrates. The Court does seem will-
ing to tread carefully so as to justify and legitimize the fact that Iraq has
replaced significant parts of Muslim private law (beyond the law of the
family) with modern civil codes largely transplanted from Europe. How-
ever, as concerns areas of core religious concern for modern Muslims, the
(for example, the reference to “Islam” in Article 2 as being necessarily equivalent to “Islamic
law”) to be inevitable or unavoidable. Id. at 536–37. A less textual approach that gave primary
voice in Iraqi constitutional interpretation to Iraqi decision makers would have revealed the exis-
tence of a vigorous debate even at the time of drafting and during the period immediately preced-
ing it surrounding precisely what the reference to “Islam,” as opposed to “Islamic law,” was
supposed to mean. This is meant only to qualify Rabb’s otherwise insightful commentary.
13. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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Court does not appear interested in engaging in the debate, leaving the mat-
ter of the Islamicity of law therefore largely beyond its purview.
In order to understand how this came to be, some familiarity with Iraqi
political influences and institutions is necessary. I therefore begin Part II of
this essay with an examination of the relevant influences and institutions
operating within Iraq, with particular emphasis on the special importance
ascribed to the Najaf-based Shi’i clerical institution, the marja’iyya, whose
role in the unfolding of Iraq’s constitutional system (both as envisioned by
the drafters and as developed through praxis) can scarcely be gainsaid. The
balance of Part II of the essay describes the debates that arose during consti-
tutional drafting as a result of the competing interests of these various insti-
tutions and influences, and the consensus that was reached in terms of the
textual arrangement. Part III demonstrates that, in the half decade since en-
actment, emerging praxis has clearly tended to favor a reading of the text of
Article 2 that renders it almost entirely about identity and not about juristic
or judicial control over legislation to ensure Islamicity. The sole exception
to this broad trend is also described in Part III. Part IV helps to explain why
and how this consensus came about.
II. DRAFTING
By far the most important point respecting Islam and the state in Iraq,
and one I have made repeatedly elsewhere, is that to the dominant Shi’a, the
sole institution that may credibly interpret shari’a (defined for our purposes
as the vast body of Muslim rules and norms derived from sacred text) is the
marja’iyya.14 This is in contradistinction to a nation such as Sunni Egypt
where the relevant Sunni clerical institution, the Azhar, has suffered a cata-
strophic loss of legitimacy, thereby enabling a court to determine shari’a
without reference to the Azhar’s contemporary scholars.15 The distinction is
important and bears emphasis because it has tended to escape the notice of
some contemporary scholars with regrettable results.16 Admittedly, in terms
of legal and judicial structures, Iraq and Egypt are remarkably similar. In
both countries, the judiciary is trained in secular legal traditions and in the
positive enacted law of the state and unfamiliar with the learning methodol-
ogies and interpretive traditions of clerical institutions.17 In Iraq, however, a
14. See, e.g., Haider Ala Hamoudi, Orientalism and The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State, 2
MIDDLE E. L. & GOVERNANCE J. 81, 89 (2010) (reviewing FELDMAN, supra note 5); Haider Ala
Hamoudi, Money Laundering Amidst Mortars: Legislative Process and State Authority in Post-
Invasion Iraq, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 523, 537, 540–41 (2007) [hereinafter
Hamoudi, Money Laundering].
15. LOMBARDI, supra note 10, at 67–69.
16. See Hamoudi, Money Laundering, supra note 14, at 539–41 (describing common schol-
arly misimpressions created by comparing Shi’i-dominated Iraq with Sunni-dominated Egypt con-
cerning the interpretation of Article 2).
17. Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Death of Islamic Law, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 293, 311
(2010).
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vibrant, deeply respected, and deeply popular religious hierarchy remains in
place in Najaf, and the idea that secular judges would be permitted to de-
velop novel approaches to shari’a, or any aspect of Islam for that matter, in
derogation of Najaf would be deeply offensive to core Shi’i sensibilities.18
To secular Sunnis and Shi’is alike, who do not wish for shari’a to play
a large role in state affairs, this hardly poses a significant problem. The two
are merely different sects of Islam, much as Roman Catholicism and Protes-
tantism may be thought of as two sects of Christianity. As with Christianity,
to the extent that some significant portion of Shi’is and Sunnis are either not
very devout or at least are dismissive of any role for religion in matters of
state and law, the religious differences between the two present no substan-
tial difficulty. The secular Shi’a may turn to the marja’iyya on whatever
matters of religious importance they deem necessary (the days of the relig-
ious holidays, for example) while the secular Sunnis may consult whatever
authorities they wish, and none of this will have any impact on state law,
which is organized and developed entirely differently.
The problem arises for the substantial proportion of Iraqis to whom I
refer as “Islamists,” by which I mean Iraqis who seek a greater role for
shari’a in the law of the state. For Islamist Shi’a, such Islamization neces-
sarily requires juristic involvement at some level. In particular, the drafting
of a repugnancy clause would have to involve juristic representation on
whatever body makes final decisions respecting the constitutionality of leg-
islation. The two propositions, one respecting the conformity of law to
some conception of Islam or Islamic law, and the other respecting juristic
representation on the constitutional body, were never separate for the Shi’a
throughout constitutional negotiations.
To this end, early in the negotiations the Shi’i Islamists, at least in their
most aggressive formulation, proposed that Article 2 declare that law could
not violate the “rulings of the shari’a.”19 In addition, a Shi’i Islamist propo-
sal arose concerning what would become Article 92. It involved the crea-
tion of a “Constitutional Council” entirely separate from the judiciary.20
The Constitutional Council would be composed of eleven members, a bare
18. Hamoudi, Money Laundering, supra note 14, at 537.
19. This formulation respecting Article 2 is one that, according to my notes, was presented in
the middle of June, shortly after the drafting committee had been formed, by Ahmed Al-Safi—a
cleric, Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s son-in-law, and the figure generally regarded by all involved in
the negotiations as Sistani’s spokesperson.  I was given access to it by Sh. Humam Hamoudi, head
of the legislature’s Constitutional Committee (and, in full disclosure, my paternal uncle) in con-
nection with an upcoming book I am writing on the Iraq constitution.
20. Shi’i Islamist Proposal, Article 92 [hereinafter Early Shi’i Islamist Proposal]. This Arti-
cle 92 formulation appears unsigned in the constitutional records I have examined, but it is de-
scribed as a proposal and, given its content, is surely from the Shi’a Islamist contingent. The idea
of separating the Constitutional Council from the judiciary is not in and of itself novel.  It is in fact
the model used in France for the Conseil Constitutionnel. 1958 CONST. Title VII (Fr.) (creating a
Constitutional Council); id. at Title VIII (creating a judiciary that is independent of the Constitu-
tional Council).
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majority of them jurists, with the balance being “legal experts.”21 The func-
tion of this body would be to ensure constitutionality of legislation and, in
an obvious redundancy given that Article 2 already constitutionalized
shari’a, to “ensure the lack of a contradiction of the laws with the rulings of
the shari’a.”22
Most other Shi’i Islamist proposals contained in the records during this
period of negotiation drop the majority jurist requirement for the Constitu-
tional Council as well as the explicit reference to shari’a review (which is
retained in Article 2), though such proposals retain a bare minority (at times
four of nine, at other times five of eleven) of nonjudges—either experts in
religion or law—on the putative Constitutional Council alongside judges.
Given the prestige in the Shi’i public imagination accorded to jurists and
the dramatic lack of familiarity on the part of judges with shari’a, the Is-
lamists probably assumed, and probably correctly, that it was highly un-
likely for all five judges on the Constitutional Council to vote unanimously
against a united block of four jurists on a matter of shari’a. Nearly all rele-
vant drafts also clearly grant the Council the ability to determine the consti-
tutionality of legislation prior to enactment, as Deeks and Burton also
report.23
Yet all of this proved extraordinarily controversial. Just as the Shi’i
Islamists could not accept that the determination of shari’a would be left
with secular jurists, every single other influence operating in Iraq opposed,
at times rather vociferously, any notion of juristic involvement. The Kurds,
a minority ethnic community comprising about twenty percent of Iraq’s
population,24 tended to favor more secular approaches and strict limits on
religious influence over the state,25 and by the accounts of the members of
the drafting committee with whom I have spoken, the U.S. Embassy
strongly agreed.26 The Kurds were willing to accept some form of Islamic
control over legislation in Article 2 (though in a weaker form than the Shi’i
Islamists proposed),27 but were adamant that the judiciary exercise control
without the presence of jurists.28 The majority of secular Sunni nationalists
agreed.29 For their part, Sunni Islamists had no objection to Article 2, even
21. Early Shi’i Islamist Proposal, supra note 20.
22. Id.
23. Ashley S. Deeks & Matthew D. Burton, Iraq’s Constitution: A Drafting History, 40 COR-
NELL INT’L L.J. 1, 12–13 (2007).
24. LARRY DIAMOND, SQUANDERED VICTORY: THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION AND THE BUN-
GLED EFFORT TO BRING DEMOCRACY TO IRAQ 21 (2005).
25. Deeks & Burton, supra note 23, at 48.
26. Nearly every Shi’i Islamist member of the Constitutional Drafting Committee was of the
view that the United States efforts concerning matters of Islam and the state were largely in favor
of as much secularization as politically possible. Even Kurdish commentators, among them Fariad
Rawanduzi and Fu’ad Ma’sum, tended to agree with this assessment.
27. Deeks & Burton, supra note 23, at 13.
28. Id. at 51.
29. Id.
2010] ORNAMENTAL REPUGNANCY 699
if they proposed some significant modifications,30 but they were extremely
concerned that juristic involvement on the Constitutional Council would be
Shi’i dominated and result in a particularly strong Shi’i version of Islam
prevailing.31 Even the United Nations weighed in heavily against juristic
involvement.32
In the end, a compromise could only be reached as to Article 2 where
the constitution made clear that law could not be enacted that violated the
“settled rulings of Islam” rather than, as the Shi’i Islamists wished, the “rul-
ings of shari’a.”33 This left much undetermined, as Stilt properly notes.34
Most importantly, it is not clear whether the replacement of shari’a with
Islam changes much. Certainly the secular forces on the Constitutional
Committee and L. Paul Bremer, the head of the United States civilian au-
thority in Iraq when Iraq was under U.S. administration,35 felt that this
change was significant, making Islam more a form of “inspiration” than a
blueprint with which strict compliance was necessary.36 Moreover, the defi-
nition of “settled rulings”37 remains uncertain, as does the relationship be-
tween complying with Islam and complying with other provisions of the
constitution—for example, those guaranteeing gender equality in Article
14.38 Much work would have to be done subsequent to ratification to clarify
how all of this would work in practice.
Much less was agreed to concerning the final version of Article 92.
The Shi’a Islamists and those opposing them each made one concession.
The Shi’a Islamists agreed to make the Constitutional Council into a court,
combining its functions with those of the Federal Supreme Court and retain-
ing the “Federal Supreme Court” while removing the references to a Consti-
tutional Council. At the same time, the Shi’a Islamists insisted that the
Federal Supreme Court operate independently of the broader judicial ad-
ministrative apparatus known as the Higher Judicial Council.39 In exchange,
the Shi’a Islamists were able to extract a concession respecting Islamic ju-
30. In particular, Ayad Samara’i, according to the constitutional records I reviewed, wished
to qualify the phrase “rulings of Islam” with “on which there is consensus,” thereby ensuring that
Sunni positions on Islam, and shari’a, might be heeded.
31. Deeks & Burton, supra note 23, at 14. This was further confirmed in a conversation with
Salim Al Jibouri, a high official within the Iraqi Islamic Party.
32. This was confirmed in a conversation with Abbas Bayati, an ethnic Turkoman who was
part of the Shi’i Islamist Alliance, and Hamid Majid, a more secular presence on the drafting
committee.
33. Article 2, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of
2005.
34. Stilt, supra note 11, at 741–42.
35. DIAMOND, supra note 24, at 13.
36. Stilt, supra note 11, at 742.
37. Deeks and Burton discuss this matter in some depth. Deeks & Burton, supra note 23, at
14.
38. Article 14, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of
2005 (“Iraqis are equal before the law without discrimination on account of their gender . . . .”).
39. See id. at Article 92.
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rists. Article 92 clearly contemplates the presence of judges, legal experts,
and experts in Islamic law40 on the Federal Supreme Court. However, the
number of jurists (or judges for that matter), their means of appointment,
and the manner in which the court goes about its work is left for subsequent
legislation to be approved by a two-thirds vote of the legislature.41 The
Court was thus a judicial body but potentially quite independent of the bal-
ance of the judiciary, staffed by judges, legal experts, and jurists in propor-
tions to be determined subsequently.
III. TOWARD A WORKING CONSENSUS OF IDENTITARIANISM
A. Judicial Praxis
Such was the situation upon ratification. It is important, however, to
note one additional matter. In the interim period between enactment of the
constitution and enactment of a law respecting a new court consistent with
Article 92, the Iraqi political establishment, seemingly by unspoken consen-
sus, has permitted the Federal Supreme Court that had been created by the
interim constitution, the Transitional Administrative Law (“TAL”),42 to
continue in force.43  Furthermore, a full six years after ratification of the
constitution, the legislature remains unable to reach sufficient consensus to
enact a law with the requisite two-thirds majority to create the Federal Su-
preme Court envisioned by the Constitution. As a result, the previous, and
still existing, Federal Supreme Court remains responsible for interpreting
constitutional provisions, and does so with some frequency.
This corrects a broad misconception that had previously arisen due to
the mistaken position of one of the most respected authoritative voices on
the Iraq Constitution, Andrew Arato, concerning what was to be done be-
tween ratification of the constitution and enactment of the law envisioned
by Article 92. Arato assumed that during the interim period referenced
above, there would be no court and therefore no form of constitutional re-
view.44 The problem with this approach is that in the absence of any Fed-
eral Supreme Court, there would have been not only a complete lack of
constitutional control over the legislature’s enactment of law, but also no
body to exercise core and essential functions assigned to the Court, such as
ratification of election results and approval of the membership of the legis-
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. DIAMOND, supra note 24, at 394 (describing TAL in index as the “interim constitution”).
43. No Iraqi government institution specifically conferred on the Federal Supreme Court cre-
ated by the TAL the power to continue in force. It simply did, and, as a de facto matter, its rulings
have been regarded as those of the highest body within Iraq’s judiciary. This author knows of no
serious challenge to its legitimacy as an interim institution.
44. ANDREW ARATO, CONSTITUTION MAKING UNDER OCCUPATION: THE POLITICS OF IM-
POSED REVOLUTION IN IRAQ 238 (2009).
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lative bodies.45 This would render the functioning of the state along consti-
tutional lines all but impossible to imagine. This may well be why the
approach has been to continue the existing Court indefinitely rather than
dissolve it and leave nothing in its place pending Article 92 implementing
legislation.
In any event, this continuation of the previous court has had two im-
portant consequences. First, it has resulted in de facto acceptance of the
secularist position concerning juristic involvement. The Federal Supreme
Court as it existed when the constitution was ratified was staffed entirely by
judges and was very closely linked to the Higher Judicial Council and the
broader judicial administrative apparatus. In fact, the head of the Federal
Supreme Court, Medhat al-Mahmoud, also served, and continues to serve,
as head of the Higher Judicial Council.46
Second, the continuation of the existing court added another powerful
influence, that of Iraq’s judiciary, onto the secularist side. While judges
may vary widely in their religiosity, their professional training and culture
diverges widely from the religious practices and culture of Najaf,47 and they
were as unenthused as any over the prospect of jurists who knew not a thing
about the methodologies of law sharing a bench with them. Based on my
own conversations with the drafters of the Constitution, and by the accounts
of others who have spoken with them, the judiciary has repeatedly opposed
any suggestion to include jurists.48 When asked to recommend proposals
respecting and implementing law for Article 92, which specifically contem-
plates juristic involvement, they have adopted the most minimalist reading
imaginable.49 They have suggested that some very small number of jurists
might sit solely as advisors rather than as full members of the court.50
While in many ways the status quo favored the secularist position, the
Shi’a Islamists retained, and continue to retain, significant popular support,
which grants them some measure of power as well. The two dominant Shi’a
electoral lists—the Iraq National Alliance and Maliki’s Rule of Law Coali-
tion—control between them 159 out of 325 seats, not quite a majority but
certainly much more than the largest Sunni coalition (91 seats) or the domi-
nant Kurdish one (43 seats).51 Grand Ayatollah Sistani remains possibly the
45. Article 93(7), Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of
2005; id. at Article 52(2).
46. Discussion with Andrew Allen, Senior Adviser, Global Justice Project Iraq (Dec. 24,
2009).
47. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
48. Jason Gluck, Senior Rule of Law Advisor, U.S. Inst. of Peace Rule of Law Ctr. of Inno-
vation, Address at the University of Pennsylvania and National Constitutional Center Conference
on Rule of Law Reform in Iraq and Afghanistan (Sept. 23, 2010).
49. Personal communication with Sh. Humam Hamoudi, chair of the Constitutional
Committee.
50. Id.
51. Hannah Fairfield & Archie Tse, The 2010 Iraqi Parliamentary Elections, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/03/11/world/middleeast/20100311-iraq-
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most beloved popular figure in Iraq today; to doubt his authority is to court
severe disapproval among many Shi’a.52 Or, as one prominent Shi’a Is-
lamist member put the matter, “driving to work today I passed seven stores
with the picture of Sayyid Sistani in them, and those were the ones I could
see. Do you want to know how many pictures of [Supreme Court Chief
Justice] Medhat al-Mahmoud I saw?”53
The Federal Supreme Court, therefore, does not particularly want ju-
rists to sit on its bench, and the secularists in the legislature are capable of
blocking legislation that would force their presence. At the same time, the
Court, while enjoying a remarkable rise in legitimacy in its function as the
authority responsible for the interpretation of law,54 does not enjoy anything
like the type of popular support that Sistani commands, and certainly would
have its credibility severely and strongly challenged if it dared to question
Sistani.55 The result has been a marked reluctance on the part of the Court
to address repugnancy very much so as not to stir the Shi’a into forcing a
confrontation respecting juristic presence on the Court.
B. Juristic Restraint
On its own, this reluctance can hardly be the basis of an emerging
consensus in that it seems as if it makes matters even worse for the Shi’a
Islamist coalition. Under the current status quo, not only is Article 92 not
implemented, but even Article 2 has been rendered meaningless in terms of
its practical legal effect. In fact, Shi’i dissatisfaction did not arise because
concomitant to the process of judicial avoidance of Article 2 was a corre-
sponding lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Najaf jurists to involve them-
selves directly in matters of government.
In the fall of 2009, I managed a visit to all four of Najaf’s Grand
Ayatollahs, three of them (i.e. all but Sistani) with a large delegation.56 I
election.html?ref=middleeast. To be clear, the largest Sunni coalition in fact “won” the election in
the sense that they received more votes than any other single electoral list, largely because the two
dominant Shi’a factions were divided.  Nevertheless, post-election political wrangling has led to
Maliki’s reinstatement as Prime Minister. John Leland & Jack Healy, After Months, Iraqi
Lawmakers Approve a Government, N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 22, 2010, at A6.
52. DIAMOND, supra note 24, at 127.
53. Personal communication with Shi’a Islamist member (Aug. 31, 2010). The question was
rhetorical—in Iraq, as in the United States, the picture of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
does not appear in very many public locations. This is, to be clear, not meant to be in any way a
negative reflection on the admirable legal acumen of Judge Medhat, only an expression of the
realities of public awareness of judicial figures anywhere, even significant ones.
54. Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Iraqi High Court’s Understated Rise to Legitimacy, JURIST
(Apr. 23, 2010), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2010/04/iraqi-high-courts-understated-rise-to.
php.
55. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
56. The delegation included, in addition to myself, Gary Sick, former national security direc-
tor to President Carter (and a current professor at Columbia University’s School of International
and Public Affairs), Richard Norton of Boston University, Dale Eickelman of Dartmouth, and
Glen Howard of the Jamestown Foundation.
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was struck by how often and how forcefully all of them indicated that the
marja’iyya was to play no direct role in government. Rather, the marja’iyya
should only support, guide, and correct government from the outside, in the
hopes that the government would heed its advice.57
There is considerable overstatement in this, at least as a statement of
intent throughout the post-Saddam era. Indeed, there would have to be in
order to make the debates over Article 2 and 92 make any sense at all. Yet it
is also clear that Najaf’s jurists, if they so desired, would have been able to
assume more important state functions than they currently do. Sistani would
not so much as meet with Bremer, preferring instead to exert his influence
from the outside rather than to assume any formal role in governance.58
Even when the American occupation formally ended, neither Sistani nor
any other major jurist sought any state positions.
In fact, even the juristic interventions into politics have been remarka-
bly restrained. The Najaf jurists, led by Sistani, have never sought to use
their influence to cause the state to prohibit the sale of alcohol, legislate
women’s dress, or impose the harsh criminal penalties derived from tradi-
tional readings of shari’a. Instead, their intervention pertains to such mat-
ters as the necessity of elections,59 anticorruption,60 and ensuring that
educational materials do not foment sectarian division.61 It is understanda-
ble why the jurists might choose this course—for the most part, the jurists
enjoy reasonable popularity even among Sunnis, Kurds, and secular or less
religious Shi’a. This would almost certainly change if the jurists sought to
use political influence to enforce religious law. They would become parti-
san figures and their popularity (and concomitant political influence) would
almost surely begin to wane. It is one thing for Najaf to decry the disturbing
tendencies of Iraq’s political class to vote itself all sorts of perquisites of
office; there are few who would object to Najaf’s protestations of the politi-
cal classes enriching themselves from the public coffers. By contrast, Iraq’s
significant drinking population would surely resist any attempt by Najaf to
ban alcohol nationwide. The opposition among the moneyed classes, or
among banking interests, to any attempt by Najaf to advocate in favor of the
traditional shari’a prohibition on money interest on debt would be even
more strident.
57. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Navigating the Najaf Mantra with the Four Grand Ayatollahs,
THE DAILY STAR (LEBANON), Nov. 5, 2009, available at http://www.mallat.com/LawPageDS/
Hamoudi5Nov09.pdf.
58. DIAMOND, supra note 24, at 83.
59. ARATO, supra note 44, at 115.
60. In December of 2009 at a Friday sermon in the Kerbala Mosque, millions of Iraqis (in-
cluding me) witnessed Ali Al-Safi, Sistani’s son-in-law, take a strong, public, and widely dis-
cussed stand against the alleged free distribution of real estate to high government officials.
61. Steven Lee Myers, Iraqi Cleric Avoids Using His Power to Sway Voters, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2010, at A4.
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Moreover, it is unclear why the Najaf jurists would necessarily want to
demand nationwide shari’a compliance. In more religious, Shi’i dominated
areas of the country, where tribes exert enormous influence and the word of
Sistani is taken quite seriously, shari’a violations, such as the consumption
of alcohol, nonmarital sex, and promiscuous dress, would never be con-
ducted openly. These are close-knit communities where one’s reputation
and honor are of considerable importance. Violence is generally not neces-
sary to ensure compliance, though at times both in Shi’i areas and outside
of them, it is used with tragic results.62 A woman in Najaf would no more
leave her home with her hair uncovered and a beer in her hand than a stu-
dent of mine would appear in my classroom drunk wearing nothing more
than a speedo swimsuit—a perfectly legal activity, even in the absence of
violence. Shaming and communal enforcement tend to work in any society,
but even more so in less individualistic ones than the United States. This is
to say nothing of the ability of merchant communities to police themselves
with a potential sanction for rule violations far more severe than the forced
compensation the state might order; namely, exclusion from the commu-
nity.63 As a final matter, Najaf’s political influence, and that of Sunni Is-
lamists as well, is sufficiently strong so as to make it a matter of near
certainty that the law will always pay some heed to core religious interests,
to the extent they make themselves known.
In many ways, this system suits Najaf quite well—the jurists may con-
trol the areas under their influence without state interference through
promulgating non-state rules. They may also enter the foray of politics to
preserve key interests (elections, which the religious Shi’a naturally are able
to win given their numerical superiority) or serve broader public interest
goals (those respecting anticorruption), which have the salutary effect of
enhancing their broader popularity. Moreover, all of this takes place in a
political milieu in which it would be next to impossible to convince the
majority of parliament to enact a law to which Najaf is implacably opposed.
Thus, inasmuch as the state is concerned, Najaf’s relative separation en-
ables it to involve itself in politics at places and times of its own choosing
without having to compromise its own interests. Najaf may pronounce
shari’a without state interference and reasonably expect adherence among
the Shi’a faithful and in Shi’a dominated areas, and it may enter the politi-
cal fray where and when it chooses without being deemed to endorse all
laws to which it fails to object.
By contrast, if Najaf jurists were actually on a Federal Supreme Court
and were asked to decide whether or not a particular law (alcohol licensing
62. Damien Cave, Four Truck Bombs Kill 190 in Kurdish Area of Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15,
2007, at A1 (referring to the stoning of a Yazidi woman for dating a Sunni Arab man).
63. See, e.g., Haider Ala Hamoudi, Baghdad Booksellers, Basra Carpet Merchants, and the
Law of God and Man: Legal Pluralism and the Contemporary Muslim Experience, 1 BERKELEY J.
MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC L. 83, 116–22 (2008).
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law, law respecting maximum interest rates, etc.) violated the “settled rul-
ings” of Islam, to use the terminology of Article 2, the juristic ability to
navigate political matters on their own terms would end. The positions
taken by jurists on that court would either seem to legitimate whatever prac-
tice was being challenged on religious grounds, or the jurists on the court
would be placed in the entirely unenviable position of having to prohibit a
law that significant non-Shi’i (or Shi’i secular) portions of the population
might find rather appealing, thereby incurring strong opposition. The ubiq-
uitous pictures of Sistani, of which my parliamentary colleague was so
proud, might become somewhat less prevalent. It is altogether easier for
jurists to do as Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Saeed al-Hakeem did in his
conversation with me, which was to carefully describe the rules respecting
usury and then shake his head in genuine sadness when I told him of the
ubiquity of money interest in modern global economies. If the Grand
Ayatollah himself (or, more likely, an appointee) was placed on a court, this
could not be as easily managed, as legal action would be required following
the head shaking once a case was brought to the court. A judiciary com-
posed of secular judges might be able to skillfully avoid the question of the
Islamicity of money interest through any sort of combination of avoidance
techniques (among them delays in hearing the case, expansions of political
question doctrines, or deciding cases on procedural grounds without reach-
ing constitutional merits), but a jurist on a court could hardly do the same
without risking some credibility as to his determination to effect
Islamization.
What therefore emerges from this complex web of institutional inter-
ests and rivalries is something of a consensus wherein the judicial authori-
ties control law, the jurists control shari’a, and each endeavors to stay
largely out of the way of the other. This is not, to be clear, Jefferson’s “wall
of separation.”64 It is well known, for example, that Iraqi public schools
have always mandated religious instruction and nobody of significance in
Iraq is suggesting that this century-old system be changed. Nor is anyone
suggesting that religious rules have no place in matters of law and govern-
ment concerning family law in particular. Nevertheless, Iraq is developing
into a legal and political system where, in contradistinction to the dictates of
Article 2, shari’a exists not so much over law as alongside it.
C. Qualifications—The Limits of Shari’a
None of this explains the lone exception to the Court’s unwillingness
to address Article 2—Decision 60 of 2010.65 This is a matter that deserves
64. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, President, to Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins & Ste-
phen S. Nelson, Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802).
65. Federal Supreme Court, Decision No. 60 of 2010, available at http://www.iraqja.iq/view.
738/.
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separate and special consideration. In that case, a party had sought to prove
the existence of a construction contract between him and another party.66
When he was unable to produce a writing, and offered “personal evidence”
instead, the case was dismissed in the lower court, pursuant to Article 77 of
the Law of Evidence, which requires the existence of a contract over a set
amount to be proved by means of a writing.67 The appellant’s allegation
was that the necessity of a writing to satisfy evidentiary requirements was a
violation of Article 2 because it conflicts with shari’a.68
Before explaining the Court’s basis for upholding the lower court deci-
sion (and thus Article 77 of the Evidence Law), it should be said that there
is no requirement, or even recommendation, among shari’a authorities,
Sunni or Shi’i, that a contract be placed in writing. If anything, the sugges-
tion appears to be that oral contracts for sale are preferred, if not required.
For example, Grand Ayatollah Sistani indicates that a contract for sale need
not be concluded in Arabic, though he does indicate that the contract is
concluded any time that one party “utters” a sale for a price, and the other
party “utters” acceptance.69 For obvious reasons, there is a special dispensa-
tion for those unable to speak to grant acceptance through hand motions,
and to those unable to move or to speak to rely on writings.70 More impor-
tantly, Sistani indicates there are two opinions respecting whether or not
one capable of movement or speech may use a writing, and that the “more
manifest” (a typical Shi’i juristic use of indirect terminology to express a
preference) is that writings are acceptable.71 Grand Ayatollah Khu’i, who
preceded Grand Ayatollah Sistani as the leading scholar in Najaf until his
death in 1992, takes an even stricter view, suggesting that while there are
two opinions, the “more manifest” merely “tolerates” writings if one is ca-
pable of speech.72 Finally, Sunni classical rules appear plainly to favor oral
contracts over those conducted in writing, treating those in writing as hav-
ing no evidentiary value, precisely the opposite conclusion of Article
77(2).73
Thus, the Court could have determined that the pronouncements of the
Grand Ayatollahs and the Sunni classical authorities favor oral contracts,
and that therefore to require contracts to be in writing violates the “settled
rulings” of Islam. It also had, however, ample resources at its disposal to
suggest that there is no religious consensus on the matter. Classical Sunni
opinion aside, it is self-evident that those organizing (Sunni-dominated) Is-
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. ALI AL-HUSAINI AL-SISTANI, 2 MINHAJ AL-SALIHIN ¶ 51 (12th ed. 2008).
70. Id. at ¶ 55.
71. Id.
72. ABUL QASIM AL-KHU’I, 2 MINHAJ AL-SALIHIN ¶ 51 (1992).
73. Jeanette A. Wakin, Introduction to THE FUNCTION OF DOCUMENTS IN ISLAMIC LAW 1, 6,
10–11 (Jeanette A. Wakin ed., 1972).
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lamic finance at a major international bank such as HSBC would rely on
written contracts.74 Moreover, as we have seen, the Grand Ayatollahs do at
least “tolerate” written contracts. Taken together, while this does not mean
Islam itself conclusively requires written contracts, the Court could credi-
bly maintain that a state law requiring them is certainly not a violation of a
“settled ruling.”
The Court instead took a different and more provocative approach. In
addition to maintaining that Article 77 did not contradict a “settled ruling”
of Islam, it argued that requiring a written contract harmonized with Islam,
citing two verses of the Qur’an in order to reach this conclusion.75 In other
words, it did something that in the previous two sections I suggested it
should be quite reluctant to do. It challenged the jurists, stating on the basis
of Qur’anic text that in fact (and, implicitly, contrary to the juristic conclu-
sions described in the previous few paragraphs) written contracts were at
the very least Islamically recommended, if not required. This is certainly
not the opinion of Sistani, who has described them as acceptable, based on a
sounder opinion, but certainly not the preferred course.
Despite the obvious provocation, I maintain that this requires only a
partial qualification of my earlier conclusions, one that I have described
elsewhere at some length.76 The reality is that even though the jurists de-
scribe in detail the rules on shari’a as they concern matters of commerce,
interest in them in the modern world is exceedingly slight with only two
discrete exceptions, the historic rules translated in modern parlance to
prohibitions on money interest and those concerning forms of speculation.77
Even in Iran, where jurists control the state, the state freely adopts trans-
planted French civil rules for contracts, and not the rules of the very jurists
who run the state.78 Concerning such matters, the shari’a is purely concep-
tual, theory without the slightest intent of practice, because the rules, as
they exist, are simply incompatible with running a modern economy.79
Even a casual comparison of Sistani’s rules and those of Iraqi law on
the matter of the Court’s decision is instructive as to why this is. Article 77
of the Law of Evidence imposes a writing requirement for transactions gen-
erally, while the rules of Sistani and Khu’i described above relate to a con-
tract for sale.80 This is because the traditional Islamic rules have no general
74. See HSBC AMANAH: ISLAMIC FINANCE FOR LIFE, http://www.hsbcamanah.com (last vis-
ited Jan. 31, 2011).
75. Federal Supreme Court, Decision No. 60 of 2010, available at http://www.iraqja.iq/view.
738/.
76. Hamoudi, The Death of Islamic Law, supra note 17, at 323–25.
77. Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Muezzin’s Call and the Dow Jones Bell: On the Necessity of
Realism in the Study of Islamic Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 423, 445–47 (2008).
78. Hamoudi, The Death of Islamic Law, supra note 17, at 316.
79. Id. at 322.
80. Compare Art. 77(2), Law of Evidence, No. 107 of 1979 (Iraq), with SISTANI, supra note
69, at ¶ 55, KHU’I, supra note 72, at ¶ 51.
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theory of contract, but instead divide contract into nominate forms, among
them sale, lease, partnership, and the like.81 If the Court actually wanted to
take these rules seriously, it would have to examine the validity of Article
77 as against each shari’a based nominate form of agreement and the rules
of formation related to them, effectively exploding the general theory of
contract upon which modern commercial systems are founded. To describe
this as devastating from an economic perspective if carried out broadly is to
understate the matter considerably.
Given the material realities, to ignore the bulk of Islamic rules as they
pertain to commerce seems the only option, and the one taken by Islamic
states and commercial actors alike, even devout ones.82 This gives the Court
some purchase to use somewhat provocative reasoning to reach the conclu-
sions it does respecting written contracts without fear of causing a juristic
reaction. After all, if Iran’s controlling juristic authorities do not care to
adopt Islamic rules on contract, it is hard to believe that jurists in Iraq,
given their restraint, will be very exercised about what the Court does to
legitimate, on Islamic grounds or otherwise, thoroughly transplanted rules
with roots now reaching back decades upon which its modern economy is
based. The reaction would certainly not be the same were the Court to tread
upon areas of religious doctrine that modern Muslims, within their own
modern sensibilities and their framework understandings of Islam, would
regard as core doctrine. This is probably why the Court chose to stake this
ground on the matter of written contracts and not the permissibility of inter-
est or rules concerning Islamic dress.
IV. WHY ARTICLE 2?
In some ways, the consensus reached, while salutary enough, is rather
perplexing. Under this consensus, Iraqi jurists have been content with
avoiding state enforcement of shari’a in the post-Saddam era. They are in-
stead satisfied as to their ability to control their own constituencies and
unconcerned with enforcement of shari’a on other domestic constituencies.
Their primary interest lies in matters of policy and political interest that do
not implicate the core of the traditional shari’a. Yet if all of this is true, then
why would Islamists have bothered with Articles 2 and 92 in the first place?
Surely all of it could have been achieved without reference to a state body
empowered to invalidate law to the extent that it conflicts with “settled
rulings” of shari’a. The simpler solution would have been to leave the court
as it was (which ultimately occurred as a de facto matter anyway) and focus
attention elsewhere.
Two explanations may be offered for the fight over Article 2. The first
relates to an important shift in emphasis on the part of the Shi’a Islamists
81. Hamoudi, The Death of Islamic Law, supra note 17, at 308 n.70.
82. Id. at 322.
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themselves by virtue of their continued political power. The second, more
important explanation is somewhat subtler and relates to identitarian values
rather than legal effects. I shall discuss each in turn.
A. Comforts of Majoritarianism
Turning first to the shift in emphasis, one cannot underestimate the
continued hold of Saddam Hussein over the Shi’i imagination well into the
drafting era. Accordingly, major figures within the Shi’i Islamist movement
insist that the primary point of Article 2 was to limit state incursions on
religious freedoms.83 Shi’i Islamists routinely insist that in the Saddam era,
young Shi’i men would be afraid to attend the mosque because so many
religious people were detained for no reason other than their religiosity.84
Prohibiting the state from violating the “settled rulings” of Islam ensures
that the state cannot limit public prayer, religious dress, or force state work-
ers to eat during daylight hours during the month of Ramadan as they allege
Saddam to have done. While Islamists also indicate that they continue to
think Article 2 is important for this reason and that Article 2 will not func-
tion properly without Article 92 legislation being enacted, there is no ur-
gency to this because, at least for the moment, religious rights of this sort
are not under threat. No law, they admit, could pass at this time and in this
political environment that would violate Islam’s “settled rulings.”
At some level, this defense of Article 2 sounds preposterous. To say
that religious rights of the sort the Islamists are discussing are not under
threat is to understate the matter considerably. It is obvious to anyone who
has worked with the Iraqi legislature even casually that there is not a single
member who would, at least publicly, support the notion that the headscarf
should be prohibited or that state workers should be forced to eat during
Ramadan. To fear this seems almost paranoid, yet given the outrages of the
previous regime and the extreme repression of the Shi’a during that period
in which basic Shi’i rituals were prohibited,85 the fear is, if nothing else,
grounded in good faith. The impact of that severe repression on the Shi’a
and their continued fear of a reversion to those times is very real. Yet at the
same time, the relative strength of political movements based on Shi’i Is-
lamism, which remain dominant in Iraq through 2010, helps Shi’i Islamists
justify their seemingly indefinite deferral of Article 92 legislation, thereby
making Article 2, to their mind, interpreted as it would under current condi-
tions by a judiciary whose rulings on such matters they would never deem
credible, effectively unenforceable.
83. Personal communications with Sh. Jalal uddin Al Sagir, Ali Allaq, and Sh. Humam
Hamoudi, senior figures within the broader Shi’i Islamist movement.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Megan K. Stack, March of a Million Pilgrims Shows Shi’a Power, NEWARK
STAR-LEDGER, Apr. 22, 2003, at 6 (describing the first opportunity the Shi’a had in decades to
practice basic religious rites).
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Still, a robust free exercise clause would have easily achieved the goal
of protecting worship (and much less controversially).86 In fact, there does
seem to be more at work for the Shi’i Islamists than mere freedom of wor-
ship. There is no doubt in my mind, for example, that if anyone were politi-
cally naı¨ve enough to propose a bill permitting same-sex marriage in Iraq,
Najaf would object vociferously and lend its political weight to blocking
such a measure, yet this would not implicate the religious rights of any of
the Shi’i faithful. It was, after all, concern regarding how far Article 2
would be read to ensure Islamicity of legislation that led to Kurdish and
secular objection to the robust forms of review originally proposed by the
Islamist Shi’a. Nevertheless, it is fairly clear that whatever the Shi’a Is-
lamists originally intended concerning the scope of Article 2 beyond the
noncontroversial robust free exercise aspect they continually advance, at
this point its legal interest to them has been largely muted. This is because
of the combination of the judicial capture of the institution responsible for
ensuring constitutionality of legislation, the relative comfort of the Shi’a
that the power they yield in the legislature is sufficient to ensure whatever
level Islamicity they desire, and the general juristic preference, for the rea-
sons already described, to remain outside of state control.
B. Identitarian Value
There is more at work than this, however, given the continued rhetori-
cal importance of Article 2 not only to the Shi’a, but to Sunni Islamists as
well. There appears to be some form of identitarianism that animates much
passion even (or perhaps especially) when the legal content of the provision
is minimized or nearly eliminated. That is to say, it is less important that
Article 2 as a legal matter be used to force legislation to comply with
shari’a than for it to be used as a forceful assertion of identity—to establish
Iraq as a state that does not permit law to violate Islam’s “settled rulings.”
Thus, for example, Iraqi politicians are unable to describe with any level of
precision (or any consensus of any kind) what would violate a “settled rul-
ing” and whether any existing legislation is subject to scrutiny. Yet the for-
mer speaker of the Iraqi legislature, the Sunni Mahmoud Al-Mashhadani,
may declare in open session (and in full view of cameras broadcasting the
matter to Iraqi television homes) that he would pound with his shoe any bill
brought to him that contradicted shari’a. Mashhadani surely did not mean
this as legal intent—he never sought to ban money interest, for example—
but the identitarian assertion that Iraqi law must conform to shari’a was
important to make even if it was effectively devoid of legal content.
86. In fact, such a clause already exists. Article 43 of the Iraq Constitution guarantees free-
dom of worship and specifically mentions the previously banned Husseini rituals. Article 43,
Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005.
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To reiterate the point, no wall of separation exists between religion and
state, and legislators certainly would not themselves consider enacting law
that they believe in their own view (using whatever subjective and almost
certainly arbitrary87 test they choose to apply) violates core Islamic teach-
ings. Thus, it is not so much that Islam has no role in the state, as that the
notion of repugnancy, by which I mean specifically the empowering of the
judiciary (or any constitutional body) to void legislation that conflicts with
some vision of Islam, is, from a legal standpoint with the exception de-
scribed above (which, it might be said, legitimizes law rather than invali-
dates it), largely an empty one devoid of legal content and meant only as
identity assertion. That is to say, as would be the case in the absence of a
repugnancy clause, the legislature is entirely free to call upon Islamic val-
ues and to enact law referencing them to any extent that it wishes, subject
only to the political constraint of retaining public favor.
Perhaps the greatest demonstration of the extent to which Article 2 has
been rendered largely devoid of legal content lies in the story of the Kurdi-
stan Constitution. Having developed a regional constitution in June of last
year and aware of the serious controversy that would surely underlie some
of its key provisions,88 Kurdish leaders made a series of late changes
thereto, possibly in the hope (though ultimately a vain one)89 of muting
Arab objection.90 One of these changes was to conform Article 6 of the
Kurdish Constitution to Article 2 of the Iraqi Constitution, making it impos-
sible for regional law to violate shari’a.91
This is rather remarkable considering that the Kurds, by and large
more secular than their Arab brethren in Iraq, were, as I noted earlier, the
strongest domestic force opposing the Article 2 formulations proposed by
the Shi’i Islamists. One would not, therefore, expect the Kurds to empower
their judiciary to invalidate legislation on the same basis. The fact that the
Kurds were willing to do this, when in the Kurdish city of Suleymania alco-
hol is far easier to purchase than it is in the entire state of Pennsylvania,
shows the extent to which, in Iraq, repugnancy has become more a matter of
an assertion of a Muslim identity than it is a genuine intent to limit legisla-
87. See Hamoudi, The Death of Islamic Law, supra note 17, at 328–32 (criticizing repug-
nancy as being applied fundamentally inconsistently).
88. Michael J. Kelly, The Kurdish Regional Constitution Within the Framework of the Iraqi
Federal Constitution: A Struggle for Sovereignty, Oil, Ethnic Identity, and the Prospects for a
Reverse Supremacy Clause, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 707, 709 (2010) (describing some of the more
provocative aspects of the constitution).
89. While the Kurdish government approved the draft of the constitution, after high-level
American intervention, it was not scheduled for referendum and thus is still not in force. Id.
90. Compare DRAFT KURDISTAN REGIONAL CONST. (Oct. 13, 2008), available at http://www.
gjpi.org/2009/06/24/draft-kurdish-constitution/, with DRAFT KURDISTAN REGIONAL CONST.: UP-
DATED (June 24, 2009), available at http://www.gjpi.org/2009/06/24/draft-kurdish-constitution/.
91. DRAFT KURDISTAN REGIONAL CONST., Article 6 (Oct. 13, 2008), available at http://www.
gjpi.org/2009/06/24/draft-kurdish-constitution/; DRAFT KURDISTAN REGIONAL CONST.: UPDATED,
Article 6 (June 24, 2009), available at http://www.gjpi.org/2009/06/24/draft-kurdish-constitution/.
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tive discretion. The secular Kurds and the Shi’a Islamists do not agree on
much concerning Islam and its role in the state beyond, that is, their willing-
ness to proclaim that identity proudly and forthrightly.
V. CONCLUSION—THE CENTRALITY OF PRAXIS
To students of American law, little of the increased marginalization of
Article 2 should seem unfamiliar. There are various clauses in the United
States Constitution that have been so narrowed by the Supreme Court as to
be of virtually no practical import, perhaps most prominent among them the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.92 Other clauses of once central impor-
tance, most importantly the Contract Clause, have been narrowed so sub-
stantially and are invoked so infrequently that most American law students
often graduate without knowing their textual content, much less any prece-
dent surrounding their interpretation.93
Nor should the notion of identitarian value to constitutional text seem
entirely foreign to those familiar with the United States Constitution. In the
2010 midterm election cycle alone there have been dozens of references to
“We the People” as some sort of full-throated expression of popular sover-
eignty, notwithstanding the fact that the clause itself, from a strictly legal
point of view, has never been held in any notable precedent to mean any-
thing at all.
The difference, in the end, lies less in the nature of the constitutions, or
their means of evolution, than it does in the manner in which they are ap-
proached. In the United States, it seems rather uncontroversial to study our
constitutional text as against the context in which it unfolds, both in the
courts and beyond them. We understand some constitutional text to carry
legal meaning, and other constitutional text to be more identitarian in na-
ture. We are fully aware that somewhere between the text and its applica-
tion lies a disparate community of institutions of influence with widely
varying interests and abilities to control the interpretive process, and as a
result we never declare constitutional meaning on the basis of text alone,
without careful consideration of this broader context, and its influence on
how the constitution will be understood.
By contrast, study of all too many foreign constitutions proceeds on
grounds we might dismiss in the United States context as mechanical, sim-
plistic, and naı¨ve, focused as it is on text to the exclusion of praxis, and
without due regard for the local community where the text will come to be
92. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT 291, 313 (2007)
(disapprovingly describing the clause as being “effectively read out of the Constitution . . . .”).
93. James W. Ely, Jr., Whatever Happened to the Contract Clause?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV.
371 (2010) (describing the Contract Clause as having “undergone such a dramatic decline,” and
offering a personal anecdote concerning a top student who was unfamiliar with the clause
entirely).
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applied.94 Nowhere is this sin more obvious than in considerations of
shari’a and law where the prevailing assumptions are characterized by what
my learned and justifiably well-regarded colleague Russell Powell would
describe as “essentialism,”95 or what I might refer to as the reification of
shari’a. The assumption appears to be that shari’a is some absolute, un-
changing, globally recognized whole, and that therefore once a decision is
made to conform law to shari’a, assumptions may be drawn about what this
means, and its consequences for the state, in the absence of praxis on the
part of local decision-makers. It is not, to reiterate, a position that would be
taken remotely seriously in the American academy if advanced in the
American context.
There is some irony to this. Upon first reflection, it might appear as if
American commentators are ill-equipped to discuss constitutions in the Is-
lamic world in particular given the vastly different cultural context. While
there may be some truth to this, very often the problem is in fact the re-
verse. We do not, by and large, lack the methodological tools to understand
constitutional text and praxis in Muslim countries; in fact, we have those
tools in abundance. The real problem, all too often, is no more than an
unwillingness to use them.
94. See supra Part I.
95. Russell Powell, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Seattle Sch. of Law, Address at the
University of St. Thomas Law Journal Spring 2010 Symposium: Islamic Law and Constitutional
Liberty (Apr. 8, 2010).
